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Abstract. The conception of metaphoric process elaborated by Mary 
Gerhart and Allan Russell illuminates a key mechanism often involved in 
the most significant advances in science and religion. Attention to this 
conceptual device provides a productive way to reframe the relationships 
and dialogues between the fields. The theory has compelling implications 
for reframing the understanding of theology and its task. 
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Bidisciplinary dialogue between Mary Gerhart (religious studies) 
and Allan Russell (physics) has involved them in reflection on the 
creation of understanding in science and religion that has resulted in an 
explanatory scheme that is remarkable on a number of counts (1984; 
2001). I focus here on three contributions that I believe have the most 
significance from the perspective of religious studies and theology. 
 
Reframing Fields of Meanings 
Their chief contribution is the explanatory scheme itself, which 
Gerhart and Russell call “metaphoric process” (1984). It is important to 
stress that their concern is to explain a key epistemic mechanism often 
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involved in extraordinary advances in science and religion. They are not 
proposing a comprehensive theory of metaphor, although metaphors 
often are indicators of the process they seek to illuminate. It also is 
important to keep in mind that they are not proposing a 
comprehensive theory of discovery. Their focus is on this one specific 
mechanism and its implications. 
 
To situate this process in a broader epistemological context, they 
envision our inquiries about the world and ourselves taking place in 
“cognitive spaces” or “worlds of meanings.” These worlds of meanings 
are made up of networks of interrelated concepts, or “fields of 
meanings.” The sciences, religion, and the common sense of an epoch or 
culture are examples. The concepts within these fields do not stand 
directly for things themselves but for our notions of these things. The 
notions are defined by their interrelation with other notions. For 
example, to get some conception of house, one must have other 
notions available (lumber, bricks, wall, window, roof). These other 
notions are variable, as are the relations between them: not all houses 
are wood or brick and have four walls. So meaning as a social, cultural, 
and historical artifact “arises out of the interaction of concepts and 
relations, and is expressed in the topography of the field” (Gerhart and 
Russell 2001, 12). It follows that meanings (of house, atom, soul, body, 
spirit, and so on) can vary significantly over time or in different cultural 
and social contexts. Our worlds of meanings are made up of col- 
lections of these fields of meanings. These constitute our idea of the 
way things are. Although these fields of meanings are culturally and 
historically conditioned, Gerhart and Russell regard an individual’s or 
community’s construal, when it is successful, as genuinely corresponding 
to reality in this indirect and relative way. 
 
Their theory proposes to explain how fundamentally new 
understandings and meanings develop among those who share such 
worlds of meanings. They distinguish between such uncommon 
innovations, or “tectonic reformations,” in fields of meanings and either 
the more routine acquisition of data or the extension of concepts that 
increase what we know in a field without essentially altering our worlds 
of meanings. The great majority of advances in science and religious 
studies involve these more ordinary increases in knowledge. Such, for 
example, is the gain in astronomy effected by the sighting of a new 
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planet or a black hole. The increase of knowledge in such cases is 
through an accumulative process. Such discoveries have significance for 
astronomy but do not alter the field as such. The imaginative extension 
of concepts that led to the hypothesis of black holes in the first place is 
different. That kind of advance is achieved when analogies are made 
between some thing or datum that is known (or known better in one 
respect or another) and another phenomenon known less well. As a 
result, the second phenomenon is better understood. Such analogical 
processes add new meanings to a field and may have considerable 
impact on it but still do not transform the field as such. In contrast, 
Copernicus’s insistence that the sun is the center of the universe, or 
Newton’s insistence that the mechanical laws of the heavens are 
identical with the earth’s, created unexpected understandings that 
changed fundamental notions within physics—and indeed changed how 
we understand the world. 
 
Gerhart and Russell observe that the key mechanism for 
transformations such as these is the forcing of an analogy between two 
meanings that, given the understandings of the day, is unwarranted. In 
Copernicus’s case, for example, the affirmation that the sun is the 
center conflicted with the standard account at the time that the earth is 
the center. To affirm that the laws of heaven and the laws of the earth 
are the same, as Newton did, also entailed forcing an affirmation that 
contradicted meanings taken for granted in contemporaneous science. 
But the effect of these forced affirmations, despite their apparent 
unreasonableness, was to open up possibilities for understanding that 
had not been available before. 
 
What most distinguishes such uncalled-for analogies is the 
disruptive effect on the fields of meaning associated with them. The 
force of the analogies does not simply add new information to the 
world of physics and astronomy, expanding knowledge the way the 
discovery of a new planet or a new mechanical law might. Nor does it 
clarify the given world of meanings, the way affirming an apt analogy 
between something known and something unknown might. In Newton’s 
day, for example, Galileo’s understanding of the heavens and Kepler’s 
understanding of mechanics were already known. The uncalled-for 
analogies had a more tectonic effect because they forced a reframing in 
the until-then accepted fields of meanings. The result was reconfigured 
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fields of meanings that constituted a better understanding of reality. In 
that sense, the result was a new world of meanings. Moreover, such 
shifts in fields of meanings typically make available a new logic and 
understanding of what is reasonable. Conceptual moves are possible in 
Einstein’s world that were inconceivable in Newton’s, and moves in 
Newton’s world would not have made sense in Galileo’s. Each metaphoric 
act has the potential to lay the groundwork for otherwise unthinkable 
later moves. 
 
This reframing of the fields of meanings is the fundamental 
characteristic of the process Gerhart and Russell call metaphoric. That is 
what distinguishes it from the rhetorical moves we more commonly 
label analogy or metaphor, neither of which reconfigures fields of 
meanings themselves or logical relations between them. To keep that 
difference in mind, Gerhart and Russell distinguish between the 
metaphoric, on the one hand, and metaphors and the metaphorical, on 
the other. On their accounting, most metaphors are not metaphoric 
because they do not create the possibility for new meaning this way by 
disrupting the fields of meanings. 
 
The first three essays in New Maps for Old (Gerhart and Russell 
2001) provide an array of brief illustrations from science and religion. 
The authors have analyzed several more extended illustrations: in that 
book, the Bible’s identification of Yahweh (God of Exodus) with El (God 
of the Fathers), and in Metaphoric Process (1984), the special theory of 
relativity and the religious notion of life after death. Although it is not 
one of their examples, the affirmation that “Jesus is the Messiah” is 
another paradigmatic instance of the metaphoric process. Given the 
images current in the eschatology of the day, affirming that God was 
victorious in the crucified son of a carpenter from Nazareth was uncalled 
for. In fact, most of the key eschatological images by which Jesus is 
identified in the biblical Gospels have something of this metaphoric 
dimension. By ordinary logic he was not a victorious king of Israel; he 
was not a “Son of Man” who descended gloriously from the heavens; he 
was not acknowledged by his people and did not vanquish their 
enemies. To affirm that Jesus is the Messiah is to force an analogy 
between him and Israel’s expressions of hope and trust in God. This 
requires a different understanding of God, Israel’s hope, and Jesus. 
Affirming that Jesus is the Messiah forces a thoroughgoing revision of 
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the field of meanings operative in Palestinian Judaism or at least those 
operative in the narrative worlds of the New Testament. It reframes the 
meaning of messiah, the identity of Jesus, and the field of meanings 
associated with messianic hope. This makes possible logical moves that 
are otherwise un- available and lays the groundwork for later moves 
otherwise unthinkable.  
 
Six entailments of such metaphoric moves are noteworthy. First, 
such acts are epistemological in nature. They are not simply rhetorical 
tropes but rather are reconfigurations of the fields of meanings by which 
the world is apprehended. 
 
Second, metaphoric affirmations make real, though logically and 
semantically altered, assertions. Despite their apparent 
unreasonableness, forcing such analogies does not result in nonsense. 
To the contrary, twisting accustomed meanings in these situations 
opens up possibilities for understanding that otherwise would not be 
available. On this reading, for example, Christians do intend to force the 
identity between “Jesus” and “Messiah.” The logic of this move loses its 
force if Jesus is not in some sense properly and literally the one 
expected. I use literal here advisedly. The conception of metaphoric 
process destabilizes the meaning of literal itself and warrants this 
qualified use. Although reference to the literal meaning often assumes 
that exact and primary meanings are univocal and constant and that 
fields of meanings are stable, the metaphoric process presupposes that 
meanings are dynamic and relative. In a metaphoric affirmation words 
come to have new exact and primary meanings. Moreover, in the 
reframed context, these meanings are semantically proper, logically 
warranted, and factually the case—three further important denotations 
of literal. After Thompson and Joule, heat is motion. After Einstein, it is 
literally true that the speed of light is the same for all observers. For 
those whose world of meanings has been transformed by the gospel, 
Jesus is the Messiah. 
 
Third, notions have such metaphoric thrust only to the extent 
that they continue to force disruptions in our fields of meanings. If, as 
is often the case in science, a metaphoric assertion is so effective that it 
produces a permanent change in meanings, the metaphoric dimension, 
as we say, dies. “The efficacy that kills the metaphors of science does 
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not prevail with respect to many metaphors of religion precisely because 
of our inability to see the world as religion says it is. We fail to 
understand, and so the metaphor lives on” (Gerhart and Russell 2001, 
29). 
 
Fourth, reception is a crucial element in metaphoric acts. The 
new meanings and logical entailments are available only to those who 
are able and willing to accept the reframed field of meanings. Some will 
not. For example, a historian who misses the metaphoric thrust of the 
affirmation that Jesus is Messiah might legitimately conclude that the 
claim is an analogical assertion—in some ways justified, in other ways 
not. A biblical fundamentalist would likely disagree with the conclusion 
but share the assumption of a nonmetaphoric reading. Both would 
miss what I am suggesting is the affirmation’s logical significance. 
Misunderstanding is possible because the same assertion can be 
coherently interpreted as metaphoric, analogical, or univocally literal, 
and the parties might be quite unaware of their different interpretive 
assumptions. 
 
Hence, a fifth important entailment of Gerhart and Russell’s 
explanatory scheme: Metaphoric acts are not necessarily self-conscious 
and frequently are unnoticed. We need not suppose that Copernicus 
was aware that he was acting metaphorically or that most believers are 
conscious of the metaphoric thrust of many of their central convictions. 
 
Moreover, recognizing a move as metaphoric does not establish its 
truth. For example, there is nothing in principle that precludes a non-
Christian or a fundamentalist Christian from understanding what is 
entailed in the attribution of a metaphoric dimension to the affirmation 
“Jesus is Messiah.” But understanding the proposed explanation that the 
fields of meanings have been reframed does not necessarily entail being 
persuaded either that the identity claim in the New Testament is in fact 
metaphoric or, if it is, that the proposed alterations in fields of 
meanings truthfully illuminate the phenomenon in question. So a sixth 
implication is that demonstrating that an act is metaphoric does not 
prove it true. 
 
Gerhart and Russell suggest that two broad criteria are relevant 
to this issue of truth. The first is productivity or efficacy. A productive 
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metaphoric act is one that results in images that are useful and 
effective. The distortions created by reframing the fields of meanings 
open us to new ways of imagining and describing reality. They also 
speak of this criterion as the “test of increased intelligibility,” that is, a 
test of whether the changes in the fields of meanings increase 
intelligibility of the world—not only for ourselves but also for others 
(1984, 167). Their second criterion is “onto- logical flash,” which they 
describe as “a surprising experience that creates conviction (sometimes 
a conviction that might be said to ‘go beyond all reason’)” (2001, 40). 
For example, Copernicus made his assertion with “no definite 
observational evidence whatsoever” to support it (2001, 24). 
 
The claim that Jesus is Messiah indicates both the relevance of 
these general criteria and their limitation. There can be little doubt 
that this reconfiguring of the fields of meanings was a particularly 
effective way for early Christians to articulate convictions entailed in 
their cultic celebrations of Jesus’ significance. Moreover, this metaphoric 
act constituted tenacious convictions that were at the same time 
counterfactual. But it is conceivable that this productive and inspired 
conceptual move was nevertheless mistaken. The criteria for making 
such judgments involve fragile and tentative interpretive implications—
much more so in religion than in the natural sciences. Gerhart and 
Russell of course acknowledge this. It is an issue that will bedevil any 
analysis that engages questions about our fundamental convictions, in 
part because any proposal will presume prior convictions about how one 
assesses convictions. So, to analyze this dimension, one must move 
beyond Gerhart and Russell’s formal explanatory hypothesis to engage 
particular philosophical and theological construals. Noting this limit does 
not undermine the explanatory power of their theory. Still, questions 
about assessing the truth of metaphoric acts at a formal level need 
further attention. An analysis of religious convictions elaborated by 
James McClendon and James Smith, another bidisciplinary team 
(Baptist theologian/atheist philosopher), may prove helpful with this. 
 
Reframing Dialogue 
Gerhart and Russell take the metaphoric process and its 
reconfiguration of fields of meanings as the key to understanding the 
most significant similarities between science and religion. Doing so 
effectively reframes the relationships between the disciplines, for then the 
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focus of dialogue is pushed beyond the respective conclusions, analyses, 
and data to a more fundamental interrogation of what is going on with 
the prior, deeper, defining fields of meanings in which they are situated. 
In speaking here of religion (or theology) as a discipline, Gerhart 
and Russell understand it broadly as “philosophical reflection upon 
explicitly or implicitly religious experience and language” (2001, 158–59). 
They concur with those who hold that “religion,” in this sense, “and 
science are not only compatible but cooperative and complementary 
fields of intellectual endeavor” (1984, xv). As we have seen, however, for 
them the congruity is rooted in the disciplines’ common epistemological 
structures. Both science and theology exhibit metaphoric advances that 
create new worlds of meaning. Hence, both also exhibit the drive of 
human understanding to push beyond its limits toward a horizon that 
continues to recede (1984, 188). Science and theology both respond 
and witness to such “limit experiences,” but they do so in different ways. 
For the most part, the response within the “rigidly circumscribed” range 
of scientific considerations is not explicit (2001, 29). A rare example of 
scientific theory giving theoretical status to such limit experiences is 
Gödel’s Theorem which “states that there is no way to prove that any 
given mathematical system is closed” (Gerhart and Russell 1984, 176). 
Theology, however, has theoretical resources for exploring experiences of 
limit and transcendence. Such conceptions are developed from its 
analysis of “meanings” rooted in our lived and reflective experience as 
conscious beings situated in particular historical, cultural, and religious 
contexts. Because the need for empirical evidence derived from 
experiment and observation generally precludes, or seriously 
circumscribes, investigation of such resources, scientific inquiry needs to be 
complemented by theology. But theology, in attending to its realm, 
necessarily foregoes the probable and predictive meanings established 
through empirical observation in the sciences. “In making its turn 
toward the human and away from measures of the world, theology turns 
away also from this time and space independence of scientific 
understandings” (Gerhart and Russell 2001, 160). Hence, theology 
needs science with “its ability to give a theoretical status to our 
determinate understanding of specifiable data” (1984, 167). 
While Gerhart and Russell affirm the complementarity of science 
and theology, they are more reserved in their judgments about what 
the disciplines can directly learn from one another and about the direct 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, Vol 39, No. 1 (March 2004): pg. 49-62. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article 
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
9 
 
impact on one another. This is clearly, in part, a lesson drawn from their 
own experience in bidisciplinary dialogue. Particular meanings in their 
respective fields are often far more subtle than even a well-informed 
outsider understands. Practitioners in a discipline have a more 
comprehensive and empathetic grasp of how its fields of meanings fit 
together and so have a kind of connatural knowledge that enables them 
to recognize when a specific application of a notion makes sense and 
when it does not, or when a metaphoric move increases intelligibility 
and when it is just silly. (See Gerhart and Russell 2003 for their 
discussion of empathy in scientific and religious understanding.) But this 
perspective is not just a result of their personal experience in 
bidisciplinary dialogue. The focus on fields of meanings required by 
attention to the metaphoric process reframes the focus of dialogue 
between disciplines. 
 
In that light, they suggest that the natural sciences are more 
likely to affect religion by reforming the world of meanings within which 
theology explores the limits of human understanding than by 
presenting some particular finding that causes change in religious 
doctrines or narratives (2001, 155–66). The relationship parallels that 
between pure mathematics and physics. Pure mathematics does not tell 
anything about the real world. This is what its purchase of axiomatic 
certainty costs. As a result, advances in pure mathematics do not 
necessarily have direct implications for physics. “Most likely, depending 
on the branch of mathematics involved, there are no implications at all” 
(2001, 158). 
 
But that does not mean mathematics has no significant relevance: 
The physicist sees new mathematics as a region in which to 
prospect just as Einstein did when he needed an analytic 
geometric structure for his general theory of relativity. He found 
and made use of Riemann’s geometry, a development in 
fundamental mathematics made fifty years earlier. . . . A more 
general statement might be that new mathematics expands the 
realm of the computable or otherwise analyzable relations and 
that some of these relations may, at some time, turn out to be of 
value to physics.” (2001, 158) 
Gerhart and Russell suggest that, just as pure mathematics provides 
this world of meanings having to do with the computable and 
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analyzable in which physicists can prospect, the natural sciences shape 
our understandings of empirical reality, particularly of what is 
believable, and thus provide theology with worlds of meanings within 
which to prospect. Increases in our believable world of meanings have a 
significant but indirect impact on theology’s fields of meanings. Science 
over the last five hundred years has vastly enlarged the scope of what is 
believable, and rather than reduce the scope for theology, understood 
in this way, science in fact increases it. Reframed dialogue, therefore, 
does not involve point-to-point mapping between disciplines. 
Theologians should “not feel constrained to make particular doctrines 
compatible with particular scientific theories” (2001, 174). It is their 
expectation that breakthroughs in the natural sciences will cause 
changes in what it is possible to believe, in the same way that break-
throughs in mathematics have caused changes in what is analyzable. 
 
Reframing Theology 
In Gerhart and Russell’s own estimation, the chief contribution of 
their bidisciplinary dialogue for religious studies has been 
to provide a conceptual tool to support the expectation and 
existence of novelty in theological as well as scientific traditions. . 
. . When people change, what can be affirmed changes. When 
people are no longer willing to say “yes, I can believe that,” their 
failure of faith has less to do with natural science than with their 
own experiences in the world. The need to understand both 
these experiences and those of natural science makes it possible 
and necessary to do new theology today. (2001, 60) 
Thus, the reframing of fields of meanings and of dialogue leads 
to a reframing of theology and its task. This strikes me, as a theologian, 
as the most compelling implication of their explanatory scheme—
although it is more implied in their work than spelled out. To the extent 
that theological “meanings” are metaphoric, theological investigation 
must be attentive to the interpretive effects of this process. 
The degree to which theological meanings are in fact metaphoric, 
however, is itself a substantive theological issue. If it is granted that at 
least some theological meanings are metaphoric, pressing questions 
arise about which are metaphoric.  Given the inescapable pluralism of 
our situation today and the apparent conflicts among the multiplicity 
of convictional traditions and within them, there is no way to avoid 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, Vol 39, No. 1 (March 2004): pg. 49-62. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article 
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
11 
 
further questions about how and whether metaphoric acts taken as true 
by one group might be confirmed more generally as true by others. 
 
Moreover, Gerhart and Russell presuppose that the concern of 
religion and theology is ultimately with reality at the limits of our 
experience. The thesis, however, is itself a controverted philosophical 
and theological stance that requires confirmation. So too is their claim 
that the metaphoric process is a powerful tool for showing how and that 
this is the case. Although there are some formal epistemological 
grounds for Gerhart and Russell’s explanatory scheme, I take it largely 
as an a posteriori hypothesis. Does metaphoric process in fact explain 
better than other available theories key aspects of religious convictions 
and theological understandings? The importance of their illustrations is 
the a posteriori confirmation that these provide for the theory’s 
explanatory power. But this evidence, while suggestive, is limited to 
brief sketches. Can close and detailed analysis show that metaphoric 
process helps resolve significant theological controversies? that it explains 
the conceptual moves of specific theologians? that it significantly 
clarifies conceptual moves in a number of different traditions? that it 
can facilitate more productive dialogue across confessional and 
convictional lines? These questions effectively pose a new research 
agenda. Can more extensive analysis sustain the notion of metaphoric 
process as an explanatory scheme? 
 
These questions also suggest a reframing of theology’s task. If 
religious meanings are metaphoric, understanding them requires that 
this dimension be explicitly disclosed. First, theology must recognize the 
consequent twisting of the associated fields of meanings. Second, it 
must understand how exactly the fields of meanings have been 
reframed. Third, it must comprehend the logical and conceptual 
implications of this reconfiguration. Finally, it must investigate the 
warrants for this new understanding. Such a theology of disclosure 
would seek to clarify in this way the relationship between what is 
believed and what is believable. It would do so by paying more 
attention to how religious meanings are used (what is done with the 
meanings and by the meanings) and how these meanings are related 
to the larger world of meanings before moving to discussions of the 
meanings themselves in scriptural, historical, and systematic 
investigations. This sort of theology of disclosure would offer an 
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alternative prolegomenon to the standard appeals to fundamental 
theology, natural theology, or apologetics. Gerhart and Russell do not 
make this proposal themselves, but I believe that their notion of 
metaphoric process implicitly calls for such a reframing of theology’s first 
task. 
This conception is not unprecedented. Robert Sokolowski (1982; 
1994) has made a substantial case for the unique logical status of the 
Christian conception of God as creator.  Although he does not refer to 
Gerhart and Russell’s theory or develop a notion comparable to it, his 
illuminating exploration of the logical implications of what he calls the 
Christian distinction implicitly illustrates a key example of the metaphoric 
process operative in a Christian context. He describes his work as a 
“theology of disclosure,” and it does exemplify a number of the features, 
though not all, that I have in mind in using the characterization. To 
some extent, then, his work can be seen as a more detailed and 
comprehensive confirmation of Gerhart and Russell’s theory in one 
religious context. As such, it also is an example of the reframing of 
theology which I believe their theory suggests. 
 
My own recent investigations (Masson 2001; 2003) provide some 
de- tailed analysis to sustain the case for reframing theology along 
these lines. An example is the controversy between Joseph Bracken 
(1996; 1999) and Elizabeth Johnson (1996; 1999) over the doctrine of 
providence, which had been debated in Theological Studies and 
subsequently at meetings of the American Academy of Religion and the 
Catholic Theological Society of America. Gerhart and Russell responded 
to the discussion (2001, 167–76) in part by questioning Bracken’s and 
Johnson’s appeals to scientific notions. This occasioned some of their 
observations reported above. Although they argue that theologians 
should be free to prospect among scientific notions, as we have seen, 
they also warn that there is not—and theologians need not feel 
constrained to prove—a one-to-one mapping of scientific findings and 
theological doctrines. There are limits and dangers to prospecting in 
foreign territory. 
 
Mining one’s own territory—in this case, theology’s—also has its 
dangers, however. The notion of metaphoric process can be helpful in 
alerting us to these risks. The Johnson and Bracken discussion, for 
example, was for the most part framed as a question about which of 
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two metaphysics (Process or an updated Thomism) offers better 
analogies for conceiving God and divine providence. But a close reading 
of the debate reveals that Johnson, along with a number of 
contemporary theologians inspired by Aquinas, is also making a 
fundamental, but by and large implicit, metaphoric move. Framing the 
question as a debate about whose analogical paradigm is more apt does 
not excavate the core issue. Johnson seeks to avoid this difficulty in the 
original article and in her responses to Bracken by explaining how the 
analogous character of language about God war- rants her position. 
Her appeal to the Thomistic doctrine of the analogy of being, however, 
serves only to reinforce Bracken’s conviction that the crucial issue is 
about the choice of metaphysical paradigms. Should we think of the 
fundamental reality as “being” or as “becoming,” as substance or as 
process? If Johnson is committed to Thomism, Bracken does not see 
how she can avoid the pitfalls of a metaphysics that conceives reality in 
terms of substance, even if the highest instantiation of reality, God, is 
conceived as being-as-such and as immaterial. 
Close analysis discloses that a much more fundamental dispute 
is at issue, about how we know and speak of God in the first place and 
about the way analogies for God apply at all. Such analysis reveals that 
Bracken presumes a somewhat standard account of analogy as the 
identification of realities (or meanings) which have some things in 
common as well as fundamental differences. There has to be something 
in common between creator and creature, Bracken reasons, or else the 
analogy turns out to be an equivocation. He detects such equivocation 
in Johnson’s assertion that it is a frequent misunderstanding of the 
analogy to think of God and creatures as “uncreated and created 
instantiations of ‘being’ which is held in common by both” (Johnson 
1996, 11). Bracken does not see how this explanation can avoid 
equivocation. Thomists claim that God’s essence is esse, “to be.” This 
entails one of two possibilities. Either God is the primary instantiation 
of being—unique perhaps as the only entity that possesses being by 
nature but nevertheless the highest exemplification of being that other 
realities have in lesser degree—or else the meaning of being is 
completely different when applied to creator and creature. If the latter 
is the case, it would mean that we can say nothing informative about 
God. If the former is the case, and if being is conceived with the 
analogy of sub- stance in mind, then, because of the static and 
impersonal character of the analogue, all kinds of mental gymnastics 
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and equivocation are required to account for genuine change and 
freedom in the creator and the creature. Hence, Bracken concludes, 
conceiving the basic reality as process (or becoming), even if this seems 
counterintuitive at first, offers a more fruitful analogy for conceiving 
God and accounting for divine providence and human freedom. 
The difficulty with this standard account of analogy is that it 
misses the metaphoric thrust of both Johnson’s argument and the 
positions of con- temporary Thomists such as David Burrell (1979), 
William Hill (1971), and Karl Rahner (1966; 1978), to whom she and 
even Bracken himself appeal. This metaphoric dimension of their 
understanding explains why in their reckoning there are no direct 
analogies of the sort Bracken imagines between creature and creator. 
The only way to speak of God is by stretching language to the limits. 
The forced analogies that result from such metaphoric thinking do not 
grasp the reality of God but by a twist of thought reflexively and 
indirectly signify what is meant. The point is not to find apt analogies 
for God but to find a different way of thinking and signifying, to find a 
way of employing our analogies to signify what cannot be described—to 
attend to a reality that is in principle beyond grasp. To achieve this 
end, analogies are “forced” in the way Gerhart and Russell described, 
and as a consequence our normal fields of meaning are reframed and a 
new logic and understanding of what is reasonable becomes possible. 
The standard account of analogy, however, does not adequately advert 
to this shift in fields of meanings. To detect this, it is necessary to pay 
attention to such theologians’ use of analogy rather than to what they 
say about analogy. That is the aim of a theology of disclosure, as I 
understand it: to lay out how such metaphoric analogies stretch our 
language, reframe our fields of meanings, and consequently make 
available conceptual moves that are otherwise unthinkable. 
 
Take, for example, Aquinas’s assertion “God is simple.” Burrell 
argues that this does not describe a feature or characteristic of God 
that we can directly grasp or comprehend. It does not enable us to fit 
God into the categories used to speak of every other reality. It does not 
intuit some quality in God (simplicity) based on an analogy with that 
same quality to a lesser degree in ourselves. Rather, when Aquinas 
treats the simplicity of God, Burrell sees him asking whether God can be 
located semantically the way other realities can. Is God a body? Is God 
composed of matter and form, of substance and accidents? Is there 
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any way in which God is composite or enters into compositeness with 
other things? Burrell traces how “Aquinas monitors each possible way to 
get hold of something: locating an object in space and time or saying 
anything about it.” The upshot, Burrell claims, is that “God escapes our 
grasp on every count” (Burrell 1979, 18– 19). In the case of every 
other reality, whether physical, mental, real, or imaginary, one can 
locate the thing and speak about it as a composite of matter and form, 
accidents and substance, potency and act, genus and species, or form 
and esse. The point of Aquinas’s discussion is to show that God 
transcends this sort of description. If God is the sort of reality 
Christians believe God to be, the beginning and end of all things, then 
logically and grammatically God does not fit into any of these 
categories. But because such categories are the only tools available in our 
language and grammar for talking about realities, God included, asserting 
God’s reality requires purposefully breaking the rules in a way that 
indirectly displays what cannot be directly described. Hence, Burrell 
urges us to watch Aquinas’s linguistic “performance,” that is to say, how 
he uses language and how language works, when he affirms “God is 
simple.” Even though the term simplicity is substantive and thus sounds 
like a quality or description of God, Aquinas uses the term as shorthand 
for denying that any substantives, at least as we know them, can apply 
to God without the significant qualification just made. If God is the 
beginning and end of all things, God cannot be like other things, and 
the grammar we use to speak of God cannot operate the way that it 
operates when we talk about such entities. 
When theologians such as Burrell, Rahner, or Johnson appeal to 
the “analogy” that Aquinas forced between God and to be, they are 
excavating the bedrock of that grammatical difference. Burrell attempts 
to clarify this unusual analogical move by analyzing the logical difference 
between the act of predicating and the act of asserting. Asserting that 
God is simple (saying that God is simple because God cannot be 
grasped in terms of  the composites that enable us to grasp other 
beings) is different than predicating to God some known composite 
(such as the simplicity we experience in other realities). The metaphoric 
act, here, consists in insisting that asserting provides the grammatical 
analogue for explaining propositions such as “God’s essence is to be” or 
“God is simple,” even though these assertions look like ordinary 
predications. Forcing this analogy between assertion and predication 
opens up space in the available fields of meanings to speak of God 
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without thereby getting God directly in our grasp. Forcing the analogy 
does not add God as an object to the scheme of known objects or add 
an objective description of God to our inventory of known entities. 
Forcing the analogy provides us with a different way of understanding 
the relation between what we intend when we use “God” and the objects 
grasped through ordinary predication schemes. It leads to a very 
different understanding of the kind of signification that is entailed when 
we speak of God. 
 
Likewise, the point of Rahner’s transcendental analysis is not, as is 
often thought, to provide a metaphysical proof for the existence of a 
transcendental object that can be known, spoken of, or described the 
way we know and speak about other realities. His analysis—like Burrell’s, 
but in a different philosophical idiom—calls attention to the logical 
difference be- tween talk of God and talk of other realties. Rahner’s use 
of such terms as “Holy Mystery,” “nameless whither,” “horizon,” and 
“asymptotic goal” (for example, Rahner 1966; 1978) are meant to call 
attention to this metaphoric shift in signification. Moreover, 
characteristic of metaphoric signification, affirming that God is 
transcendental reality effects fundamental and global changes in the 
available theological and metaphysical fields of meanings. 
Elsewhere I further trace such conceptual excavations and evaluate their 
success (see Masson 2001; 2003). In this essay I have recalled the 
general lines of their projects and underlined their difference from the 
standard accounts of analogy with a more limited aim: to suggest how a 
theology of disclosure fundamentally reframes such issues and thus 
argues for a shift in theological agenda. The discussion between Johnson 
and Bracken is at cross purposes because it is not attentive enough to 
the metaphoric dimension of theological meanings. I hazard the 
hypothesis that such theological confusion is not unusual and is ground 
that needs to be mined. 
 
Conclusion 
The chief contribution of Gerhart and Russell in Metaphoric 
Process(1984) and New Maps for Old (2001) has been to propose an 
explanatory scheme that illuminates a pivotal mechanism in advances of 
scientific and religious understanding. Focusing attention on the 
disciplines’ common epistemological foundations relocates cross-
disciplinary dialogue at a deeper level. Their theory of metaphoric 
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process itself is a result of such bidisciplinary work. The second book’s 
further explorations in science and religion indicate the fruitfulness of 
such exchanges. Their work will make a more significant contribution if 
the explanatory power of metaphoric process proves itself useful in the 
clarification of specific and significant theological controversies and if it is 
actually employed more generally as a conceptual tool in facilitating the 
dialogues between science and religion and among religions. In that 
case, metaphoric process would not only describe a way our fields of 
meanings are sometimes productively and tectonically reconfigured. It 
would auger something of a tectonic reframing of theology itself and of 
the dialogue between science and religion. 
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